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PREVIEW—Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta: A Test of State and Tribal
Sovereignty
Genevieve Antonioli Schmit*
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments
in this matter on April 27, 2022, beginning at 10:00 a.m. EST. The arguments will be presented in the United States Supreme Court Building in
the District of Columbia. John M. O’Connor, Attorney General of Oklahoma, likely will argue for Petitioner. Nicollette Brandt of the Oklahoma
Indigent Defense System likely will argue for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta1 challenges the reach of the United
States Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma2 and tests
the settled criminal jurisdiction scheme within Indian country. On April
27, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear argument on the sole question
of whether a state court has concurrent jurisdiction with a federal court to
prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian
country. The State of Oklahoma (“Petitioner”) argues that it has concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute such crimes. 3 Manuel Castro-Huerta
(“Respondent”) argues that the Court should adopt the current
understanding that the federal government has exclusive authority to
prosecute prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in
Indian country.4
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country consists of a complex web
of interlocking statutes and case law. Important among those statutes is the
General Crimes Act (“GCA”).5 The GCA was enacted in 1817 and has not
been substantially amended since 1854.6 The GCA is firmly rooted in the

*Gina Antonioli Schmit, Juris Doctor candidate 2023, Alexander Blewett III
School of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
142 S. Ct. 877 (2022) (granting certiorari).
2.
140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
3.
Petitioner’s Brief at 2, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21–429 (Feb.
1, 2022), 2022 WL 628282 at *3.
4.
Respondent’s Brief at 1–2, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21–429
(Mar. 28, 2022), 2022 WL 972538 at *1.
5.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2022).
6.
1 FELIX S. COHEN ET AL., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW § 9.02 (2019).
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provisions of early treaties related to interracial law enforcement. 7 Important to this case is the statute’s provision, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country.”8 Specifically, the phrase “sole and exclusive”
does not confer jurisdiction over all of Indian country but rather applies
federal criminal law to Indian country.9 The GCA has been commonly understood as Congress extending to Indian country the “general laws” enacted by Congress to govern federal enclaves and therefore establishing
federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes that would otherwise be prosecuted by a local authority.10
The federal government has criminal jurisdiction over these “general” crimes in Indian country unless: (1) the offense is committed by an
Indian against another Indian; (2) the offense is committed by an Indian
who is punished by local tribal law; or (3) a tribe has entered into a treaty
with the U.S. to retain exclusive jurisdiction over the offense.11 The Court
added a fourth exception in 1882 in McBratney:12 if the offense is committed by non-Indians against other non-Indians and there is no treaty provisions to the contrary, the state has exclusive criminal jurisdiction.13
Another important statute to criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is the Major Crimes Act (MCA).14 Enacted in 1885, Congress passed
the original MCA in response to the Court’s decision in Crow Dog, 15
which held that neither the federal nor territorial courts had jurisdiction
when an Indian murdered another Indian in Indian country.16 The MCA
confers jurisdiction to federal courts when an Indian commits one of the
offenses enumerated in the MCA against an Indian person or property of
another Indian person within Indian country.17

7.
Id.
8.
18 U.S.C. § 1152.
9.
In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 578 (1891). See also, COHEN, supra note
6 § 3.04[1] (“Although the term “Indian country” has been used in many senses, it is
most usefully defined as country within which Indian laws and customs and federal
laws relating to Indians are generally applicable.”).
10.
18 U.S.C. § 1152. For a larger discussion of this statute, see Jordan
Gross, Incorporation by Any Other Name? Comparing Congress' Federalization of
Tribal Court Criminal Procedure with the Supreme Court's Regulation of State Courts,
109 KY. L.J. 299, 311 (2021).
10.
Gross, supra note 10, at 311–12.
12.
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
11.
Id. at 624; 18 U.S.C. § 1152. See also, Gross, supra note 10, at 312.
14.
18 U.S.C. § 1153.
15.
Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
16.
COHEN, supra note 6, § 9.02[2][a].
17.
Id. at § 9.02[2][b].

2022

PREVIEW: Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta
3

In civil cases, the Court in the 1980s begun to employ a balancing
test to determine if the “the “exercise of state authority would violate federal law.” 18 Expressed in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,19 the
Court under this test weighs the “nature of the state, federal, and tribal
interests at stake.”20 Previously, in the “modern era” of federal Indian law,
spanning from 1959 through the 1970s, the Court applied a foundational
principle that tribes were sovereigns. 21 It relied on that principal to promote tribal self-determination.22 During this period, the Court drew heavily on foundational principles developed in the 1830s that held that tribes
retained their powers unless expressly limited through an act of Congress.23
In July 2020, the Court decided the landmark Indian law case,
McGirt v. Oklahoma.24 In McGirt, the Court held that, absent an act of
Congress to disestablish the Muscogee25 Reservation, the Muscogee Reservation remained an Indian reservation for the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction.26 McGirt simultaneously affirmed a parallel case, Murphy
v. Royal,27 in which the Tenth Circuit held that Congress had not disestablished the reservation at issue for the purposes of determining criminal jurisdiction. Both McGirt and Murphy involved defendants who were Indian
and committed crimes enumerated in the MCA; therefore, when the Court
confirmed the crime occurred on the Muscogee reservation, the cases fell
firmly under the MCA.28 Since the McGirt decision, the State of Oklahoma has launched several attacks on McGirt’s ruling, including 13 petitions for writs of certiorari.29

18.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely & Stacy L. Leeds, A Familiar Crossroads:
McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Future of the Federal Indian Law Canon, 51 N.M.L.
REV. 300, 301 (2021).
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
25.
Although referred to in McGirt exclusively as “Creek” nation, the
Muscogee Nation has formally dropped the common name (Creek) for their original
name. See Keegan Williams, Muscogee Nation Drops Colonial Era Name in Rebranding, CRONKITE NEWS: ARIZONA PBS, (Apr. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/PG9V-5JF5.
26.
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482.
27.
875 F.3d 896, 966 (10th Cir. 2017), aff'd sub nom, Sharp v. Murphy,
140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
28.
McGirt, 140 U.S. at 2459; Royal, 875 F.3d at 915.
29.
Native American Rights Fund Tribal Supreme Court Project, Petitions Related to McGirt v. Oklahoma, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND (Apr. 17,
2022), https://perma.cc/YJT8-5TY9.

4

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

B. Factual and Procedural Background
Following McGirt, Respondent, a non-Indian, was among several
defendants30 who successfully appealed their state convictions after successfully arguing to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA)
that Oklahoma lacked criminal jurisdiction over their cases. 31 As Respondent’s appeal worked its way through the OCCA, Petitioner argued it
had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government to prosecute Respondent’s case, and therefore should retain jurisdiction.32
Respondent’s case stemmed from the hospitalization of his fiveyear-old stepdaughter, who is legally blind and has cerebral palsy.33 At the
time, Respondent and his stepdaughter lived in Tulsa, Oklahoma, which
lies within the geographic area of the Muscogee Reservation, as affirmed
by the Court in McGirt.34 The victim is an enrolled citizen of the Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians, which is a federally recognized tribe.35
A jury convicted Respondent of child neglect in Tulsa Country
District Court and was sentenced to 35 years in prison.36 Respondent appealed, arguing to the OCCA that his Oklahoma conviction was invalid
after the Tenth Circuit’s Murphy decision because, like Murphy, Respondent’s offense had occurred on an Indian reservation that Congress never
had disestablished.37 As such, Petitioner lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
his case.38
Respondent’s appeal was stayed when the Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in Murphy, and the OCCA ordered the appeal
to be held pending the Court’s decision.39 After the Court issued opinions
in Murphy and McGirt, the OCCA remanded Respondent’s case to the
Tulsa County District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the Indian status
of the victim, and whether the crime occurred within the boundaries of the
Reservation.40
On remand, Petitioner stipulated that the victim was an enrolled
citizen of the Cherokee Nation, and that the crime took place within the
historic boundaries of the Cherokee Nation.41 Petitioner then argued that

30.
See Bosse v. Oklahoma, 138 S. Ct. 1264 (2018).
31.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 9–10.
32.
State’s Brief on Concurrent Jurisdiction at 1, Castro-Huerta v. Oklahoma, CF-2015-6478 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/W6YL-6E62.
33.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 9.
34.
Castro-Huerta v. Oklahoma, No. F-2017-1203, slip op. at 3 (Okla.
Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/7GGW-DC3K [hereinafter OCAA];
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2481–82 (2020).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1.
Id. See Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 937 (10th Cir. 2017).
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
Id. at 9.
OCCA, supra note 34, at 2.
Id. at 5.
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it had concurrent jurisdiction over the crime.42 The OCCA rejected Petitioner’s concurrent jurisdiction argument and held Petitioner lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Respondent. 43 The court vacated the sentence and remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the case.44
In September 2021, Petitioner petitioned the Court to grant a writ
of certiorari. The petition presented two questions: (1) whether states have
authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in
Indian country, and (2) whether the Court should overrule McGirt.45 On
January 21, 2022, the Court granted certiorari on the first question only.46
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner asks the Court to base its analysis on the State’s inherent
rights as a sovereign, while Respondent asks the Court to root its decision
in the federal trust responsibility owed to Indian tribes. The parties disagree on whether Congress preempted Petitioner’s criminal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
Specifically on this issue, the parties disagree on whether federal statutes
establish exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction when the statutes explicitly give some states jurisdiction while other states lack jurisdiction.47 Further, the parties disagree on whether the limited case law favors state jurisdiction or preemption.48 Finally, the parties reach separate conclusions
on the outcome of a balancing test between federal, state, and tribal interests.49
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues the following: (1) the State of Oklahoma, as sovereign, has authority over its own territory and to prohibit non-Indians
from committing certain offenses unless preempted by federal law;50 (2)
no federal law, including the GCA, preempts the State’s authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country;51
and (3) under a balancing test between federal, state, and tribal interests,

42.
State’s Brief on Concurrent Jurisdiction, supra note 32, at 1.
43.
OCCA, supra note 34, at 4–5.
44.
Id. at 5.
45.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429 (2022), 2021 WL 4296002.
46.
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 877 (2022) (granting certiorari).
47.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 11–13; Respondent’s Brief, supra
note 4, at 5, 13.
48.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 31; Petitioner’s Brief, supra note
3, at 19–21.
49.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 14; Respondent’s Brief, supra note
4, at 49–51.
50.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 11–12.
51.
Id. at 13.
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the State’s interests in exercising criminal jurisdiction outweigh the other
interests.52
1. States’ Authority to Prosecute Absent Federal Preemption
Petitioner asserts that, absent federal preemption, states have
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians within the
state’s territorial boarders. 53 Petitioner relies on historical examples of
states exercising this territorial sovereignty.54 Petitioner then supports its
claim with precedential case law that it argues confirms that the Court has
long recognized State’s inherent prosecutorial authority over non-Indians.55
First, Petitioner asserts a historic basis for the State to have jurisdiction over crimes committed within the State’s borders. 56 Petitioner
roots its argument in the status of states as sovereigns,57 arguing that state
territorial sovereignty predates and is embedded in the Constitution.58 Additionally, Petitioner asserts that courts have recognized states’ power to
proscribe criminal conduct and enforce their own criminal laws against
citizens of other states and nations within the states’ borders.59
Next, Petitioner argues that the states’ territorial sovereignty
equally applies to state regulation and criminal prosecution of non-Indians
within Indian country.60 Petitioner argues that Worcester v. Georgia,61 in
which the Court concluded that state law “can have no force” within Indian
Country, is not applicable here.62 Petitioner frames Worcester as outdated
because Indian territory is no longer “completely separated from that of
the states.”63 Petitioner argues Worcester itself recognized the preemptive
power of states over its citizens in Indian country because state law at issue
was invalidated since it sought to regulate non-citizens. 64 This case,
though, deals with a federal law concerning non-Indian citizens of the
State. Finally, Petitioner notes several Worcester-era federal circuit court

52.
Id. at 14.
53.
Id. at 17.
54 . Id. at 15–17.
55.
Id. at 19–23.
56.
Id. at 15–17.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 16.
59.
Id. at 16–17 (citing to Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240,
256, 266 (1891)).
60.
Id. at 17.
61.
31 U.S. § 515 (1832)
62.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 17 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at
561).
63.
Id. (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557).
64.
Id.
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decisions that affirmed the longstanding state power to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over its own citizens within state boundaries.65
Finally, Petitioner argues that since Worcester, the Court has permitted states to exercise criminal authority within Indian country when the
defendant and victims are both non-Indians. 66 Petitioner relies first on
United States v. McBratney, in which the Court found that the State of
Colorado had exclusive authority to prosecute crimes committed by nonIndians against non-Indians in Indian country within state boundaries.67
Similarly, Petitioner cites Draper v. United States,68 in which the Court
concluded in 1896 that the State of Montana could exercise criminal authority in Indian country, despite the provision in Montana’s enabling act
that provided that Indian lands within the State’s borders “shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States.”69 While
Petitioner admits both McBratney and Draper only considered crimes
committed by non-Indians against non-Indians, it argues that the facts of
the case do not constrain the reasoning to non-Indians and could similarly
apply to crimes against Indians.70
2. No Federal Law Preempts the State’s Authority to Prosecute Non-Indians Who Commit Crimes Against Indians in Indian Country
Petitioner next argues that federal law does not, as the OCCA concluded, preempt the State’s prosecutorial authority in this case. 71 Petitioner’s argument focuses on ambiguity within the GCA.72 Principally,
Petitioner asserts that the OCCA incorrectly relied on the GCA phrase
“sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States” when it concluded
the GCA conferred exclusive federal jurisdictions to crimes committed in
Indian country.73
First, Petitioner argues that the Court’s previous textual interpretations of the GCA support concurrent jurisdiction. 74 Petitioner contends
that the Court’s decisions In re Wilson75 and Donnelly v. United States76
clarified that the words “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” do not mean that
the federal government must have sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the
Indian country; rather, the words are used to describe the laws of the

65.

Id. at 18 (citing United States. v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio

66.
67.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 19 (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 621

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

164 U.S. 240 (1896).
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 23.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1152
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
140 U.S. 575 (1891).
228 U.S. 243 (1913).

1835)).

(1881)).
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United States.77 Therefore, Petitioner argues, the GCA does not give the
federal government sole and exclusive jurisdiction over Indian country,
but rather only “extends” the “general laws” that apply in federal enclaves
to Indian country.78 Further, Petitioner contends that when interpreting the
verb “extends,” the Court in other cases has found its use harmonious with
concurrent state jurisdiction. 79 Petitioner notes that the Court has never
held that the GCA created exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country and that Donnelly did not squarely address the possibility of the
states holding concurrent jurisdiction.80
Next, Petitioner asserts that Congress did not intend the GCA to
preempt state jurisdiction.81 Petitioner considers the history of the GCA
from the origins of federal enclave jurisdiction in 1817,82 to its reenactment in 1948.83 At each enactment and revision, Petitioner argues there is
no explicit evidence that Congress intended to preempt state jurisdiction.84
Finally, Petitioner argues that other federal laws, including Public
Law 280 (“PL 280”) 85 and the Kansas Act of 1940 86, do not preempt state
jurisdiction over non-Indians whose victims are Indians in Indian Country.87 Petitioner fundamentally disagrees with the OCCA and Respondent’s argument that these statutes, which give certain states the authority
to prosecute crimes perpetrated against Indians in Indian country, should
be taken as evidence that Congress preempted other states’ power to prosecute such crimes.88 Petitioner admits that the text of the Kansas Act, PL
280, and similar statutes indicate Congress believed the states lacked prosecutorial authority over these types of crimes.89 Despite those laws, though,
states retained jurisdiction because Congress has not explicitly conditioned the states’ authority to prosecute on whether Congress authorized it
in legislation.90 Petitioner further argues that, when it enacted those statutes, Congress was more focused on the lack of jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians in Indian country. 91 Petitioner contends, therefore,
that Congress intended the statutes to clarify jurisdictional questions by
affirming that states always had jurisdiction in Indian country.92

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 24; In re Wilson, 140 U.S. at 578.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 24.
Id. at 24–25 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990)).
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25–26.
18 U.S.C. § 1162
Pub. L. No. 76-565, 54 Stat. 249 (1940).
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 28–40.
Id. at 28–29; Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 27.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 40.
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3. Using a Bracker Balancing Test, the State’s Interests Outweigh Tribal
and Federal Interests
Petitioner argues the Court should apply a balancing test to find
that the State has a superior interest in exercising prosecutorial authority.93
Petitioner concedes that the Court has not applied this test as expressed in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker94 to the issue of state criminal
law in Indian country, but argues that the Court has never discounted the
possibility of its use in criminal law cases.95 If the Court adopts and applies
the balancing test here, Petitioner argues it would find that the State’s exercise of prosecutorial authority neither interferes, nor is it incompatible
with federal or tribal interests. 96
First, considering the tribe’s interest, Petitioner asserts the State’s
prosecution of non-Indians for crimes committed against Indians raises no
serious issues of tribal sovereignty involved in the State’s prosecution of
non-Indians for crimes committed against Indians.97 As such, the tribe’s
interests are low. Here, Petitioner hinges its logic on “[t]he principle from
Oliphant” that “Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and
to punish non-Indians.”98 Therefore, Petitioner argues, since tribes have
not retained their power to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes
against Indians in Indian country, the exercise of prosecutorial power by
the State does not affect tribal sovereignty.99
Next, Petitioner claims that the State’s interests are substantial and
legitimate.100 Petitioner compares the interests of an Indian tribe “despite
its diminished sovereignty” in prosecuting its own members who commit
crimes against non-Indians within Indian country with the State’s parallel
interest to prosecute non-Indians for crimes against Indians within the
state’s borders.101 Petitioner draws on briefs from the 1980s that, it argues,
demonstrate the federal government has recognized that states have a
“strong interest in enforcing [their] criminal laws against non-Indians.102
Petitioner also notes that the State has a legitimate interest in the protection
of its Indian citizens, as they are citizens of the state in which they reside
in addition to being citizens of their tribes.103

93.
Id.
94.
448 U.S. 136 (1980); see also, Hedden-Nicely & Leeds, supra note
21, at 301.
95.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 40.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 42.
98.
Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212
(1978)).
99.
Id.
100. Id. at 43.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 44 (quoting U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief on Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Arizona v. Flint, No. 88-603 (1988),
https://perma.cc/2LLX-P8CQ).
103. Id. at 43.

10

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

Finally, Petitioner argues the interests of the federal government
are furthered because concurrent jurisdiction would be the most beneficial
and efficient method of law enforcement.104 Petitioner describes the practical benefits of concurrent jurisdiction, including sharing caseloads, availability of local witnesses in state courts, and the normalcy of state and
federal concurrent jurisdiction. 105 Petitioner also notes that, as separate
sovereigns, double jeopardy is not a concern and the federal government
would be free to prosecute after a state conviction.106 Petitioner finally argues the federal judiciary has been “overwhelmed” in the wake of McGirt,
leading to constrained resources and decreased sentencing.107 Petitioner
implies that concurrent jurisdiction would address this problem.108
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argues the following: (1) statutes firmly establish federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Indians;109 (2) states generally lack jurisdiction in cases like these;110 and (3) the Court should not
apply Bracker balancing test, but if it does, the State’s interests are inferior
to the those of the tribe.111
1. Congress’s Post-1940 Statutes Preempt States from Prosecuting Crimes Against Indians in Indian Country
Respondent argues that the reenactment of the GCA in 1948
clearly preempts state criminal authority over crimes involving Indians on
Indian land.112 Respondent, in part, focuses its argument on this reenactment because it occurred after the McBratney and Draper decisions, on
which Petitioner relied.113 Respondent rebuts Petitioner’s interpretation of
the GCA’s text and then draws on the similarities between the MCA and
GCA to provide support for his argument for preemption by the GCA.114
Finally, Respondent focuses on the congressional intent surrounding the
1948 amendment and points to several other statutes enacted at the time
that explicitly grant criminal jurisdiction to certain states.115
First, Respondent argues that the text of the GCA supports
preemption. Respondent does not dispute that Congress applied laws to

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 44–45.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 5, 13.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
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Indian country governing federal enclaves.116 Instead, Respondent argues
that because the federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction
within those enclaves, Petitioner would need congressional approval to
apply the state’s criminal laws to an enclave.117 Respondent then argues
that the textual parallels between the MCA and GCA support his argument. 118 Respondent reasons that if the Court clearly held that MCA
preempts state law, the Court in considering the “materially identical text”
within the MCA should likewise find the GCA preemptive.119
Next, Respondent argues that the case law used by Petitioner does
not run contrary to the GCA’s preemption of state jurisdiction.120 Considering the passages Petitioner cites from Donnelly and Wilson, Respondent
argues the conclusion that “sole and exclusive” applies to which criminal
law applies, not federal jurisdiction itself, does not “detract from the significance of Congress’s decision to apply to Indian country the laws governing areas of ‘exclusive’ federal jurisdiction.” 121 Instead, Respondent
claims, Indian affairs are a domain where federal interest has been dominant, and the Court has enforced a standard that state law may be defeated
when the federal government aims to regulate and protect Indians against
interference.122
Further, Respondent argues that the regulatory context in which
Congress passed the 1940 amendments to the GCA confirms the Act’s
preemptive force. Notably, Respondent points to other statutes enacted in
the late 1940s that explicitly grant criminal jurisdictions to states based on
the GCA’s preemption. 123 Respondent’s examples include a statute enacted five days after the 1948 reenactment of the GCA, which gave Iowa
jurisdiction over crimes “by or against Indians,” and a similar statute enacted two days later, giving the same jurisdiction to New York. 124 Respondent argues that Congress recognized states lacked jurisdiction at the
time, otherwise they would not have explicitly given it to them.125Additionally, Respondent points to PL 280, which was enacted in 1953 and
provided some states with “jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians” that had previously fallen under federal jurisdiction.126
Respondent notes that Congress, when enacting PL 280, relied on the 1948
GCA jurisdictional scheme that effectively preempts Petitioner’s proposed
extra-statutory prosecutions.127

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 14, 15.
Id. at 15.
Id. (citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993)).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 23 (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 (1976)).
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 18, 19.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 21, 22.

12

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s interpretation of the
GCA and surrounding case law lack merit because Congress did not intend
for or believe that states had jurisdiction over this type of criminal case.128
First, Respondent takes issue with Petitioner’s argument that the “the
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier one.”129 The 1948 Congress, though, is not a “subsequent Congress” because it reenacted the GCA.130 Respondent additionally notes that the parties do not dispute that the 1948 Congress believed
states lacked jurisdiction over cases in which a non-Indian harmed an Indian on Indian land.131 Respondent then turns to PL 280 and argues that
the 1953 Congress embedded into PL 280 the 1946 U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Williams v. United States,132 which articulated that states generally lack jurisdiction over crimes against Indians in Indian country unless a statute explicitly provides states with the authority to prosecute
crimes “against Indians.”133
2. States Generally Lack Jurisdiction Over These Crimes
Respondent argues that states generally lack jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country involving Indians. Respondent relies
on Williams, in which the Court held that, because tribes generally retain
their sovereignty, states generally lacked jurisdiction absent an act of Congress. 134 Respondent expands on this principal by arguing that Congress
itself has recognized this principal and has reflected it in its construction
of statutory scheme around criminal authority in Indian country.135 Finally,
Respondent dismisses Petitioner’s arguments against preemption based on
McBratney, Draper, and other civil cases based on their inapplicability to
criminal law.136
First, Respondent asks the Court to apply the logic presented in
Williams, which builds on the foundational principal that tribes retain their
sovereign powers unless expressly limited through an act of Congress.137
In Williams, the Court held that when an offense is committed on a reservation by “one who is not an Indian against one who is an Indian,” states
generally lack jurisdiction.138 As such, Respondent argues, crimes against
Indians only have been subject to federal or tribal jurisdiction, except

128. Id. at 25.
129. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 29 (quoting Marvin M. Brandt
Revocable Trust v. United States, 572 U.S. 93, 109 (2014)).
130. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 25.
131. Id. at 26.
132. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 721 (1946).
133. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 25–27.
134. Williams, 327 U.S. at 714. See also, Hedden-Nicely & Leeds, supra
note 21, at 301.
135. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 31– 42.
136. Id. at 44.
137. Hedden-Nicely & Leeds, supra note 21, at 301.
138. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 4, at 27.
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when Congress has expressed explicitly, through statue, that state laws apply.139 Respondent asserts that because Petitioner does not cite to an act of
Congress conferring state jurisdiction, Petitioner’s argument is without
merit.140
Next, Respondent argues that because Congress “by statute and
treaty provided that the federal government—and only the federal government—would protect Indians from crime,” Congress understood the states
generally lacked jurisdiction in Indian country when Indians were involved. 141 Respondent contextualizes this assertion by first pointing to the
long-lasting trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government.142 Respondent then provides background on Congress’ exercise
of its exclusive constitutional authority to deal with Indian tribes through
the enaction of statutes143 and treaties144 governing crimes involving Indians.145 The resulting “comprehensive scheme” created by Congress is thus
evidence that “when Congress wished to leave space for other sovereigns,
it made express exceptions.”146
Respondent argues that, considering the wider statutory scheme
developed by Congress, the State lacks jurisdiction over Respondent because Congress in the 1834 GCA “made no exception for state prosecutions and instead applied to Indian country laws governing areas of ‘sole
and exclusive’ federal jurisdiction.”147 Respondent further argues that the
19th century Congresses understood the federal trust responsibility148 and
had concerns that states, given the chance to prosecute non-Indians for
crimes against Indians in Indian country, would not equally carry out justice.149
Finally, Respondent dismisses Petitioner’s arguments based on
McBratney, Draper, and other civil cases.150 First, Respondent argues that
the Court in both McBratney and Draper did not address crimes “by or
against Indians” and recognized in Donnelly that “offenses committed by
or against Indians are not within the Principle of…McBratney and

139. Id. at 29 (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
Yakima Indian Nation Yakima, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1979)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 42.
142. Id. at 31–33.
143. Id. at 33. Respondent specifically draws on the Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1790 as the first instance where Congress assumed federal jurisdiction over
offences against Indians by non-Indians.
144. Id. at 35.
145. Id. at 31–33.
146. Id. at 42.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272 (1913)).
149. Id. at 42–43. Respondent points to evidence of the State opposition
to federal policies aimed at promoting “civilization and improvement of the Indians”
and State’s use of anti-miscegenation laws which were enforced on non-Indians.
150. Id. at 44.
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Draper.”151 Because of this express limitation to the holdings, Respondent
dismisses Petitioner’s claim152 that the reasoning of both cases can apply
to crimes against Indians.153 Next, Respondent attacks Petitioner’s argument that this Court has repeatedly “upheld the exercise of state jurisdiction over non-Indians” by asserting that those cases were civil, not criminal.154 Respondent argues that this difference between civil and criminal
matters greatly in how Congress has contended with jurisdiction in the past,
and that the Court has in the past refused to conflate civil and criminal
jurisdiction.155
3. The Court Should Not Apply the Bracker Balancing Test, but if It Was
to, the Test Confirms States Lack Jurisdiction.
Respondent argues, contrary to Petitioner’s contention, that the
Bracker balancing test should not apply. 156 Respondent argues that a
Bracker balancing test only should apply absent an act of Congress; here,
statutes and treaties exist and thus govern.157 Additionally, Respondent argues that this Court has never applied Bracker in a criminal jurisdiction
case.158
Even if the Court applies Bracker, though, the test only confirms
the states lack jurisdiction, according to Respondent.159 First, Respondent
argues that a state like Oklahoma has no cognizable interest when, despite
Congress’ invitation, it declined to obtain jurisdiction under PL 280.160
Next, Respondent argues that tribes have enormous interests in protecting
tribal citizens, and the federal government has a similar interest in upholding the treaty promises to serve as tribes’ sole protector.161Additionally,
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s proposed expansion undermines tribal
authority by projecting its sovereign power directly into tribal communities.162 Petitioner also notes that even when tribes generally lack authority
to prosecute non-Indians, tribes have “weighty interests in how those prosecutions occur.” 163 For these reasons, Respondent argues that the court
should refuse Petitioner’s request to grant the state concurrent jurisdiction.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 621 (1882))
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 46 (citing Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 22).
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Petitioner asks the Court to fundamentally change the jurisdictional scheme in Indian Country, which has been long considered settled.
While the Court is not interested in revisiting the central holding of McGirt,
its grant of certiorari on the first question presented by Petitioner is concerning to many proponents of tribal sovereignty.
Based on the Amicus Briefs filed with the Court and the recent
questions asked by the Court in other cases involving federal Indian law,
the Court is likely to have several topics in mind going into arguments.
First, the Court likely will address whether state jurisdiction is preempted
in this case. This question will be largely determined by the Court’s consideration of the historical context surrounding the GCA. Next, the Court
likely will consider the policy arguments presented by Petitioner, Respondent, and Amici concerned with the broader ramifications of McGirt.
Finally, several justices have expressed unique concerns and questions
about the foundations of federal Indian law and may use this opportunity
to explore them with an eye to future cases.
1. Background of the General Crimes Act and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Based on congressional intent and case precedent, the Court is
likely to accept Respondent’s argument that there is clear and well established exclusive federal jurisdiction in this case where a non-Indian committed a GCA crime against an Indian in Indian country. While Petitioner’s argument on historical state territorial sovereignty164 may be intriguing to some members of the Court, ultimately tribal sovereignty and the
federal trust relationship with tribes pre-dates state territorial sovereignty.
It is more likely that the Court will follow its reasoning in cases as recent
as McGirt and look to explicit acts of Congress.
For instance, in McGirt, the majority drew on the long history of
the MCA, reasoning:
“By subjecting Indians to federal trials for crimes committed on tribal lands, Congress may have breached its
promises to tribes like the Creek that they would be free
to govern themselves. But this particular incursion has its
limits—applying only to certain enumerated crimes and
allowing only the federal government to try Indians. State
courts generally have no jurisdiction to try Indians for
conduct committed in “Indian country.”165

164.
165.

Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at 15–17.
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020).

16

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

Applying parallel logic to the GCA, the Court is likely to accept
Respondent’s argument that, absent an explicit act of Congress, the federal
government alone has jurisdiction over the GCA crime in this case. Because Petitioners do not cite compelling case law, legislation, or contemporary congressional understanding, the Court likely will follow the holding of Wilson and rule in favor of Respondent.
2. Policy Considerations and Impacts
Even if the Court does not apply a formal balancing test, the Court
will likely favor the policy ramifications of exclusive federal jurisdiction
asserted by Respondent. If Petitioner successfully argues that it should
have concurrent jurisdiction, nationwide criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country will be dramatically affected.
Many Amici support the policy position that, following the
“Court’s ruling in McGirt, Oklahoma’s criminal justice system has been
hobbled.”166 For example, City of Tulsa’s amicus brief highlighted the difficulties imposed on law enforcement to ascertain a victim’s Indian or nonIndian status post-McGirt.167 Similarly, the Oklahoma District Attorney
and Sheriff’s Association’s brief point out serious limitations in cross-deputization and street-level enforcement.168
While members of the court may be interested in the post-McGirt
effects in Tulsa and the rest of Oklahoma, dividing jurisdiction this way is
far from unique to Oklahoma. The current jurisdictional framework is deployed nationwide, so the Court is unlikely to elevate Oklahoma’s issues
above the potential to disrupt the nationwide approach to criminal jurisdiction.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the ongoing concerns about civil
jurisdiction in Indian country that have lingered in the background of many
of the Indian law cases currently pending in front of the Court and in the
circuit courts. The amicus briefs from, among others, the Oklahoma Farm
Bureau, Cattlemen’s Association and Petroleum Alliance, are evidence of
this concern.169 After McGirt, a slew of property law questions concerning

166. Brief of Amicus Curiae Oklahoma Association Of Chiefs Of Police
In Support Of Petitioner at 4, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429 (Mar. 7, 2022),
2022 WL 729157 at *4.
167. Brief of the City Of Tulsa As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Petitioner
at 3, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429 (Mar. 7, 2022), 2022 WL 879229 at *3–
6.
168. Brief of Amici Curiae the Oklahoma District Attorneys Association,
the Oklahoma Sheriffs' Association, the Association of Oklahoma Narcotic Enforcers,
and the 27 Oklahoma District Attorneys in Support of Petitioner at 14, Oklahoma v.
Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429 (Mar. 7, 2022), 2022 WL 729178 at *14–15.
169. Brief Of Amici Curiae The Environmental Federation Of Oklahoma,
Inc., Oklahoma Farm Bureau Legal Foundation, Oklahoma Cattlemen’s Association,
& The Petroleum Alliance Of Oklahoma In Support Of Petitioner, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429 (Mar. 7, 2022), 2022 WL 729135. See also, Allen Brown,
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transferring title and leasing Indian lands erupted in Oklahoma.170 The oil
and gas industry in Oklahoma, which operates approximately a quarter of
its wells and 60% of its refineries within Indian country, also has voiced
constant concerns post-McGirt about the potential effects on leasing and
restrictions.171 As in McGirt, the policy statements made by the Court in
this case will likely expand beyond the facts of the case and criminal jurisdiction.
3. Justice’s Larger Views on Federal Indian Law
The majority of justices likely will accept Respondent’s argument
that there is a clear and established exclusive federal jurisdiction in this
case where a non-Indian commits a GCA crime on a non-Indian in Indian
country. Several justices, though, may use this as an opportunity to advance dicta concerning their unique views on federal Indian law, and prepare for Brackeen v. Haaland172 and other hot-button pending Indian law
cases.
Recently, several members of the Court have expressed interest in
whether and how to apply the Indian canons of construction. In February
2022, during the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas oral arguments, Justice
Alito led a robust discussion about the canons, with Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Kavanagh joining.173 Justice Kagan apologized for taking the conversation outside the scope of the case at hand, but said that she
had been thinking “a good deal about these substantive canons,” how they
“reconcile our views on all these different kinds of canons,” and if the
Court should “just toss them all out.”174 The justices likely will pose similar questions and prompt similar discussions on the applicability of the
Indian canons of construction in the future.
Some justices have questioned the fundamental constitutionality
of federal Indian law as it applies differently to Indians versus non-Indians.
Federal distinctions of “Indian” have long been deemed a political, rather

Inside the Oil Industry’s Fight to Roll Back Tribal Sovereignty After Supreme Court
Decision, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/LW9R-ELMN.
170. Casey Rockwell & Izehi Oriaghan, The Dirt and McGirt: Exploring
the Real Estate Issues Surrounding the Landmark Decision of McGirt v. Oklahoma,
50 REAL EST. L.J. 502, 516–18 (2021).
171. Dino Grandoni, Now that Half of Oklahoma is Officially Indian Land,
Oil Industry Could Face New Costs and Environmental Hurdles, WASHINGTON POST
(July 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/8CWB-7KLC.
172. 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022), cert. granted sub nom; Cherokee Nation v.
Brackeen, 142 S. Ct. 1204 (2022) (granting petition for writ of certiorari); Texas v.
Haaland, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). Breckeen,
Cherokee Nation, and Texas v. Haaland were consolidated into Brackeen v. Haaland.
173. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas,
No. 20-493 (Feb. 22, 2022), https://perma.cc/H97Y-3AZ8.
174. Id. at 59–60.
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than racial classification.175 Justice Alito, though, during oral argument for
Denezpi v. United States earlier this term, asked about how a federal criminal statute can include a “racial classification.”176 Here, Justice Alito may
follow a similar vein, and question whether a possible equal protection
issue arises when a federal law hinges on the Indian status of a victim.
Justice Thomas has long proposed that the foundation of our current understanding of Indian law may be incorrect. In Baby Girl, writing
in a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas took issue with, “Congress' assertion of ‘plenary power’ over Indian affairs.”177 Justice Thomas has returned to similar questions often. In his separate concurrence in Bryant,
Thomas found “Congress’s purported plenary power over Indian tribes
rests on …shak[y] foundations.”178 Here, Justice Thomas may see an opportunity to take up this argument in dicta once again.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Petitioner likely does not have enough evidence of
congressional action to persuade the Court that concurrent criminal jurisdiction between the federal government and states exists. Additionally, if
the Petitioner’s argument were to succeed, the nationwide ramifications to
criminal jurisdiction will throw many more states into a conundrum. While
the Court may be sympathetic to Oklahoma’s rough transition after McGirt,
this is likely not the case to rework the foundational understandings of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.

175. COHEN, supra note 6, § 3.03 (citing to Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551–55 (1974))
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Denezpi v United States, No. 207622 (Feb. 22, 2022), https://perma.cc/V29B-V5WU.
177. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 660 (2013) (Thomas, J.
concurring).
178. United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140, 160 (2016) (Thomas, J. concurring).

